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SPECIFICITY AND REDUNDANT CAUSATION
HENNING STRANDIN
ABSTRACT. In this paper I present a metaphysically minimalist but theoreti-
cally strong version of fact causation, in which the causal relata constitute a full
Boolean algebra, mirroring the entailment relation of the sentences that express
them. I suggest a generalization of the notion of multiple realizability of causes
in terms of specificity of facts, and employ this in an interpretation of what goes
on in cases of apparently redundant causation.
1. CAUSES, PARTICULARS, AND FACTS
I think that what exactly the causal relation relates is a very hard question. A
common intuition is that, since causation seems to happen in the world, the causal
relata must exist in the world. Events, objects, and instances of properties exist
in the world, while propositions and facts, as ordinarily conceived, do not, but are
about the world. However, in most of our actual causal talk we don’t explicitly
designate events or objects or property instances as causes. We say things like
A: When the electromagnet was turned on, it caused the electron to emit a
photon.
B: The train was late because there was something wrong with one of the
cars.
C: That I dislike Julius Caesar is a consequence of my having to study it in
high school.
C is from Anthony Bennett’s (Bennett 1988, ch. II). In that chapter, he also explains
why A, which is in what he calls noun-infinitive form, must be relating facts. To
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translate his reasoning to our example, while turning on the electromagnet caused
the electron to emit a photon, it is not true that
A’: When the electromagnet was turned on, it caused the electron to emit a
photon at t.
Turning on the magnet did not cause the electron to emit a photon at the time t,
when it was emitted, since the time of the emission was not determined by law but
a stochastic aspect of the event. Turning on the magnetic field was not sufficient
for the emission to happen at t—nothing was, as far as we know. A and A’ “name
different facts, one richer than the other, so they could differ in truth-values” (Ben-
nett 1988, p. 25). However, the event of the photon emission was an event that
took place at t, so if making a true causal claim is a matter of referring to the right
event, then “the photon emission” and “the photon emission that occurred at t”
must refer to the same event and an event-relating causal claim using the first term
cannot differ in truth value from one using the second. This observation foreshad-
ows the main theme in this paper. It is also reminiscent of Laurie Paul’s criticism
of the event account of causation, and her suggestion that it is event aspects that
are causally related (Paul 2004).
All of A, B, and C relate facts as causes, then. We do of course also sometimes
explicitly relate things in the world, causally. As in “the bump in the road was the
cause of the damage to the car.” This designates the bump in the road as the cause.
But we know that it is very unlikely that physical objects can be the causes in any
analysis of causation. So even if that formulation is a perfectly acceptable and
intelligible causal claim, what we really mean must be that the bump’s presence
in the road, or the fact that the bump was in the road, was the cause, rather than
just the bump. Both “the presence of the bump caused the damage to the car” and
“the car was damaged because there was a bump in the road” do a better job of
articulating the cause. I take it that the former refers to an event as the cause, and
the latter relates facts. They don’t say exactly the same thing, of course. The former
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has a singular term referring to a particular event (the presence of the bump), while
the latter claim could better be understood as having an existential generalization,
true if at least one bump was present in the road. And there is no competition here,
between referring by a singular term and expressing a fact. I take it that just as we
can refer to Mozart’s death, we can refer to the fact that Mozart’s death occurred
in 1791 (like that). When we say “Mozart died in 1791” we are strictly speaking
expressing a different fact—the fact that Mozart died at least once that year. It’s
something less specific, but it works well enough as cause or effect in many causal
claims. “Because Mozart died in 1791, he did not finished the Requiem.”
Fact causes, then, can involve particulars of every kind, for example when ex-
pressed by sentences containing a reference or an existential generalization, and
this seems independent of the surface form of a causal claim. The converse—that
true causal claims always relate particulars—is more complicated. True causal
claims can designate absences and perhaps (as I will argue) disjunctive things as
causes, and it is hard to see how those always correspond to some actual particular
such that it could be causally related. I think (Schaffer 2004) ought to convince
us that absence causes are normal causes. In that article Schaffer stacks examples
of paradigmatic cases of causation and uncontroversial causal claims from science
and law, that all involve absence causation (usually in the form of double preven-
tion), and he also discusses adequacy criteria on theories of causation in light of
theses things. For now I ask you to assume—for the sake of argument—that when
particulars are involved in singular causation they are so by being involved in the
relevant facts. I will talk of these facts as causally related, even if that relation,
which relates facts that may involve objects as well as times and places, turns out
to be different in kind from one relating occurrent objects that exist in the world at
times and places.
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The fact that is expressed by a true contingent sentence I take to be the truth-
maker of that sentence—and the state of affairs expressed by a possibly true con-
tingent sentence the possibility-maker of that sentence. I will not claim that there
is such a thing making every true sentence true; I’m interested only in things that
plausibly can occur in possibly true causal claims, and that’s contingent things.
Mere possibilities are different from actualities, but even a mere possibility can
make a sentence merely possibly true. If there are possibilities, that is—and I
think there are. A deterministic physical law that allows for different initial con-
ditions of a system allows for different time evolutions of the system, and the set
of such time evolutions is the space of possibilities that is implied by that law.
(An indeterministic law need not even allow different initial conditions to imply an
interesting—albeit not a very causally interesting—possibility space.) I think the
world is governed by some law, that is necessarily underdetermined by the actual
history of the world, and thus that the world is uniquely determined only by its
actual history together with the law that governs it, and that this law can be un-
derstood as a space of possibilities. In short, the world is all the actualities and
the possibilities. But not every possibility is in accordance with the actual laws of
nature. Possibilities seem to form a hierarchy. That I am a married bachelor is a
mere logical possibility, and that I fly to work in the morning by flapping my arms
is a mere conceptual possibility. Neither is, I take it, a nomic possibility, and these
are the most interesting ones when considering causes (even if we also importantly
indulge in counter-legal causal reasoning at times), since causations are usually
believed to be law-governed.
I’ll now suggest a metaphysically “thin” theory for states of affairs and facts,
in which they are modeled as sets of possible worlds. Don’t think of these sets
of possible worlds as course-grained propositions. Think of them rather as world
properties. Something like this: take “The sentence φ is true in _” to express
a world property, the property that makes φ true, and that is interpreted as a set
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of possible worlds much like a predicate is interpreted as the set of objects that
have the property expressed by the predicate. A discussion about whether things
expressed must be things we can understand, whether truthmakers can be things
imbued with meaning, or, if not, where exactly understanding ends and truthmak-
ing begins, may be important but is way beyond the scope of this text. Likewise,
there may be sentences with different meanings that are true in exactly the same
worlds (different tautological sentences, for example), but if so, then that difference
does anyway not correspond to a difference between two worlds in our possibility
space, and we are interested mainly in such differences when investigating possible
causes and effects. There, then, is where we should begin.
2. DEFINING STATES OF AFFAIRS
If a sentence differs in truth value between two possible worlds, then these two
worlds are in some respect different. The power set P(W ) of a set W of possible
worlds contains all possible ways of sorting the worlds based on some difference
between them. That is, for any meaningful contingent sentences “φ” and “¬φ”
there are non-empty sets s and W\s (the complement set of s in W ) such that the
worlds in s differ from the worlds in W\s exactly in the way that makes “φ” true
rather than false. More precisely, let L be some alethic language for which we
already have a possible-world semantic theory, so that we have for L the relation
of semantic truth of a sentence in a world w, w φ , and of semantic entailment,
Σ  φ , where Σ is a set of sentences. (The relation is of course also relative to a
model and an assignment of values to any variables, but this will remain implicit in
our symbolic expressions.) Let W be the set of possible worlds in that theory, and
C the set of contingent sentences in L . (We require that a sentence expressing a
cause or an effect is contingent, so won’t assign states of affairs to any other.) We
can then define a function S :C→ P(W ) that assigns states of affairs to contingent
sentences:
SPECIFICITY AND REDUNDANT CAUSATION 6
Definition 1. S(φ) = {w ∈W | w φ}.
That is, the state of affairs expressed by φ is interpreted in the theory as the set
of worlds in which φ is true. The set of states of affairs constitute, as expected, a
Boolean algebra:
(1) S(¬φ) =W\S(φ),
(2) S(φ ∨χ) = S(φ)∪S(χ), and
(3) Σ  φ iff ⋂
χ∈Σ
S(χ)⊆ S(φ).
One thing worth mentioning is that this theory is immune to the slingshot argu-
ment against fact causation and any interesting correspondence between sentences
and facts in general. As employed by Donald Davidson in (Davidson 1967b), the
slingshot proves—given certain seemingly plausible semantic principles—that if
any fact is a cause of something, then every fact is a cause of that thing. The princi-
ples on which the proof relies are substitution salva veritate of logically equivalent
alternatives to φ and χ in a causal claim “χ because φ ,” and also of co-extensional
singular terms inside φ and χ . We will not dispute the first substitution principle.
Let the claim be “the pig was roasted because there was a fire in Jones’s house.”
Now Davidson says that,
if the fact that there was a fire in Jones’s house caused it to be the
case that the pig was roasted, and Jones’s house is the oldest build-
ing on Elm street, then the fact that there was a fire in the oldest
building on Elm street caused it to be the case that the pig was
roasted. We must accept the principle of extensional substitution,
then. (Davidson 1967b, p. 694.)
This substitution relies on that “Jones’s house” and “the oldest building on Elm
street” refer to the same object. That may be the case, and still the fact that there
was a fire in Jones’s house should not be identical to the fact that there was a
fire in the oldest building on Elm street. And for us, it clearly isn’t. There are
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possible worlds in which Jones’s house is not the oldest building on Elm street,
so the two sentences are not true in exactly the same worlds, hence they do not
express the same fact. That is, substitution of co-extensional singular terms does
not go through in general. More straightforwardly, since our theory already has an
identity criterion for facts (the axiom of extensionality, given that they are sets),
no language for which our theory is an interpretation, and that has singular terms
denoting facts, can prove the slingshot and be sound. (See Restall 2004 for a nice
paper on this, with proof.) With the basics in place, we can look at two issues
that are related: the multiple realizability of causes; and that of absence causation
already alluded to.
3. REALIZERS AND ABSENCES
Imagine a pigeon, Sophie, conditioned to peck at red to the exclu-
sion of other colors; a red triangle is presented, and Sophie pecks.
Most people would say that the redness was causally relevant to
her pecking, even that this was a paradigm case of causal rele-
vance. But wait! I forgot to mention that the triangle in question
was a specific shade of red: scarlet. Assuming that the scarlet was
causally sufficient for the pecking, we can conclude by the exclu-
sion principle that every other property was irrelevant. Apparently,
then, the redness, although it looked to be precisely what Sophie
was responding to, makes in reality no causal contribution what-
ever. (Yablo 1992, p. 257.)
The roles in causation of multiply realizable causes and their realizers have been
discussed in particular in the literature about mental causation. Broadly speaking,
the common belief that mental properties, states, or events supervene on physical
ones has seemed to introduce a dilemma. We often take a mental event, such as
my feeling peckish, to be the cause of some action, such as my grabbing a snack.
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But if some physical event is what realizes my peckishness, and it moreover is
causally sufficient under the conditions on the occasion for the physical event that
realizes my snack-grabbing, then either there is no causing left for the mental event
to do (by the exclusion principle, mentioned by Yablo above), or we are faced with
a case of causal redundancy. It has frequently been recognized that the problem
generalizes to cases outside mental causation, as Yablo’s example is meant to il-
lustrate. Jaegwon Kim compares the mental/physical distinction to that between
macrophysical and microphysical. His account is reductionist, but he does not
think that reducibility warrants elimination, but rather that it validates that which
has been shown reducible, at least in the case of the mental. Thus, he thinks that
mental causation “does take place; it is only that it is epiphenomenal causation, that
is, a causal relation that is reducible to, or explainable by, the causal process taking
place at a more basic physical level” (Kim 1993, p. 107). He moreover believes
that “all causal relations involving observable phenomena—all causal relations fa-
miliar from daily experience—are cases of epiphenomenal causation” (Kim 1993,
p. 95). Yablo frames his account in terms of determinables and their determinates.
He, too, wants to explain how mental events can be determined by physical events
but how they nevertheless are neither causally inert nor produce systematic causal
overdetermination. He appeals to a notion of causes being “commensurate” to their
effects: “roughly, they should incorporate a good deal of causally important mate-
rial but not too much that is causally unimportant” (Yablo 1992, p. 274), and he
also calls this “proportionality.” He observes that sometimes a suggested cause is
“overly determined,” that is to say, it is too specific and therefore not necessary for
the effect in question—and sometimes it not determined enough, too general, and
therefore fails to be sufficient for the effect. The scarlet color of the triangle is too
specific to be the cause of Sophie’s pecking, given that she was trained to pick at
red things. The pecking would have occurred even if the triangle had been some
different shade of red. Claiming, on the other hand, that it was that the triangle
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was colored that was the cause is too general, the triangle could have been colored
without it causing Sophie to peck at it. Yablo recognizes that a cause that is too
determined or not sufficiently determined for the effect at hand can have a different
effect, to which it is more proportional.
Then when do we attribute effects to mental causes? Only when
we believe, I can only suppose rightly, that the effect is relatively
insensitive to the finer details of [the mental event] m’s physical
implementation. Having decided to push the button, I do so, and
the doorbell rings. Most people would say, and I agree, that my
decision had the ringing as one of its effects. Of course, the deci-
sion had a physical determination p; but, most people would also
say, and I agree again, that it would still have been succeeded by
the ringing, if it had occurred in a different physical way, that is, if
its physical determination had been not p but some other physical
event. And this is just to say that p was not required for the effect.
(Yablo 1992, p. 278.)
All I want to add to this picture is the idea that the physical realizer p likely had
an effect, namely a realizer of the bell ringing, such that p was required for that
specific effect. That is, the fact of the occurrence of the mental event, being such
that it could be realized by one of several facts about physical events, is, as I will
call it, less specific than its physical realizer, and therefore it can at least sometimes
be expected to have an effect that is distinct from that of its realizer, in that the effect
of the mental event is proportionally general, in some lose and intuitive sense. (This
language has precedence in (Gibbons 2006, p. 94). In regards to Sophie’s pecking,
’[r]ed wins [over scarlet] without relying on magic because it is at the right level
of generality. It’s not too specific; it’s not too general; it is, as Stephen Yablo says,
“proportional” to the effect.’)
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I want to suggest that these impressions of causes being proportional to their
effects, and of—on one and the same occasion—a more general cause having a
more general effect, is directly related to the observation by Bennett quoted above,
regarding the difference in “richness” (I will call it specificity) between different
facts obtaining on the occasion of one and the same causation. I also agree that
on pretty much any occasion for which some true causal claim is made, a more
specific cause can be denoted or expressed, that will have a more specific effect.
That is to say, that cause is more specific than the one first claimed, and the effect
of that cause will have the same relation to the originally stated effect. My feeling
peckish on some occasion is realized by some particular physical state in my ner-
vous system. It, along with other necessary conditions, relegated to the background
for pragmatic reasons, caused a particular movement of my body that qualifies as
a snack-grabbing. If my peckishness really caused my snack-grabbing under those
conditions, then if it had been realized by a different physical state, then that state
might, probably, have caused a different movement of my body, but that movement
would also have qualified as a snack-grabbing. I take this to be what it means to
say that it was my peckishness that caused my snack-grabbing. If some other real-
izer of that mental state, possible under the relevant conditions, had not caused me
to grab a snack, then the mental state was not sufficient for the purported effect.
(This ignores the possibility of causes that merely raise the probability of the effect.
Throughout this paper I will assume that causes are both necessary and sufficient
for their effects under those relevant conditions that obtained on the occasion of
the causation. It is easier to maintain this condition on causes if we can reinter-
pret cases of apparently redundant causation, which is just what I try to do in this
paper.)
This view is clearly related to the discussion about fragility and robustness of
events in event-relation theories of causation. (See, for example, Lewis 1987, Ap-
pendix E.) I will return to the classical examples of causal redundancy shortly, let
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me just point out now that the problems in the event theories of causation, of mak-
ing events too fragile or too robust, are not mirrored in the fact account. We never
need to choose a level of specificity of facts—all the facts are there at all times—
and they are not indiscriminately more or less fragile, but just in the way expressed
by a corresponding sentence.
The facts of causation, it is then suggested, are usually multiply realizable. And
this is of course why they are modeled as sets of possible worlds. Each element in
that set is a possible realizer for that fact. Not only that, each subset of that set is
a fact, and a realizer of any fact that is a superset of it. There are many more facts
than there are sentences, but we knew that already.
Moreover, if we accept that facts, understood as properties of worlds and mod-
eled as sets of possible worlds, can be causes, and that these are moreover multiply
realizable when they are sets of more than one possible world, then absence causes
need not appear very mysterious. I’m wearing green shoes. This fact is multiply
realizable. My shoes have a certain shade of green, but the claim would still have
been true, and would still have expressed the same fact, if they had been a different
shade. This is also true of the possible state of affairs of my not wearing green
shoes. There are all kinds of ways in which I can wear green shoes, and in which
I can fail to do so. The fact of my not wearing green shoes is perhaps more “dis-
parate,” in some sense. I guess not-green things is not a natural kind. But whether
they are of the appropriate kind for causal claims ought reasonably be determined
by the possible truth of causal claims in which they are involved. If we believe that
absences can be causes, then it is at least somewhat comforting to note that they
are not essentially different kinds of things from presences, in that they are usually
multiply realizable states of affairs, expressible by sentences.
If we have some theory of specificity of sentences, we also have a theory of
specificity of facts, and to this we now turn.
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4. RELATIVE SPECIFICITY
There are at least a couple of ways to increase or decrease the specificity of a
sentence. We can, for example, add and remove predicates, adverbs and adverbial
phrases in a sentence such as
φ : Doris sneezed suddenly in the cold bedroom at [8 : 16−8 : 17).
We take the time to be expressed by a minute interval, for reasons that become clear
below. Davidson has shown us one logical form we can give to such a sentence if
we want to preserve the intuitive entailment from φ to
χ: Doris sneezed in the bedroom.
(Davidson 1967a, and see Ludwig 2010 for later developments and refinements.) I
will take it as a given that φ is a more specific statement, in the sense of providing
more information about what is going on, than χ is. The sentence reasonably
states that the bedroom is cold when Doris sneezes, and not when the sentence
is evaluated, so, to get access to the structure of the predicate “cold” as well as
of the adverb “suddenly” we analyze “cold” as an event, the bedroom being cold,
occurring at the same time as the sneezing. Taking e, e′ to be variables ranging
over events, and t to range over minute intervals, we can then analyze φ as
φ -f: ∃e∃e′∃t(sneezing(e)∧by(Doris,e)∧sudden(e)∧in(thebedroom,e)∧at(t,e)∧
beingcold(thebedroom,e′)∧at(t,e′)∧ t = [8 : 16−8 : 17))
φ -f entails χ-f by ∧-elimination.
χ-f: ∃e(sneezing(e)∧by(Doris,e)∧ in(thebedroom,e))
Unsurprisingly then, a more specific account of some goings on entails a less spe-
cific account of the same goings on. Our notion of specificity is very weak. There is
of course no measure of specificity (although, had we had reason to think the pos-
sibility space finite, cardinality might have been a candidate), and we can’t even
compare the relative specificity between arbitrary sentences. Specificity follows
logical strength. At least for contingent sentences. Depending on what we take
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the meaning of a tautology such as “it rains or it doesn’t” to be, we may or may
not be willing to say that it is less specific than “Doris sneezed in the bedroom,”
even tough the latter entails the former. But, surely, a contradiction is not the most
specific sentence relative to anything? Regardless, we are only concerned with
contingent sentences.
Adding and removing predicates, adverbs, and adverbials is a way of changing
the specificity of a sentence that is close to how common language works. There
is another way of treating exactly the same situation, that is farther from common
language but in a way more easy to think about. (Your mileage may vary.) We can
just put the different contingent possibilities that are compatible with our claim in
disjunction. Say that we don’t know when Doris sneezed. “Doris sneezed in the
bedroom” is equivalent to (again using minute intervals)
ψ: Doris sneezed in the bedroom at [00 : 00− 00 : 01) or Doris sneezed in
the bedroom at [00 : 01− 00 : 02) or . . . or Doris sneezed in the bedroom
at [23 : 59−00 : 00).
Clearly, φ entails ψ , since it entails χ . We can then increase specificity by deleting
disjuncts. Adding the adverbial “at [8 : 16−8 : 17)” to χ is equivalent to deleting
all disjuncts except the one stating that the sneezing happened at [8 : 16− 8 : 17)
from ψ—and results in the same sentence. Of course, this doesn’t tell us when in
the interval [8 : 16−8 : 17) the sneezing occurred, so the resulting sentence is still
equivalent to a disjunction of sentences giving the time with, for example, second
precision. Rinse and repeat. From the point of view of the facts, the one expressed
by “Doris sneezed in the bedroom” can be partitioned in many different ways, and
some of those ways will correspond to some particular aspect of how that fact
could be realized, such as its time. In many such cases, each part is expressible by
a more specific sentence, such as one of the disjuncts in ψ . What we are after here
is mainly the idea that, in all likelihood, nearly any sentence plausibly expressing
a causal fact is equivalent to a disjunction of sentences expressing more specific
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possible ways for that fact to be realized. And, since specificity follows entailment,
any contingent disjunction such that it entails none of its disjuncts expresses a less
specific fact than either of them. This is a broad generalization of the notion of
multiple realizability of causes described in the previous section.
5. REDUNDANT CAUSATION
5.1. Causes are necessary on the occasion. It is a presumption in talk about re-
dundant causation that the cause of some effect on a particular occasion (a “singular
cause”) is necessary for the effect under the circumstances that obtained on that oc-
casion. That is, given the way things actually were, had the cause not happened
neither would the effect. If this expectation is relaxed, then the problem of redun-
dancy is diminished to the same degree. I will assume that causes are, without
exception, necessary on the occasion, and I take that to be the strongest intuition
we have about causes. This does not mean that I don’t believe in general causes that
increase the probability of a general effect, but I resist analyses of causation that
take probabilities as fundamental. Partly this is because it is difficult enough to un-
derstand what the probabilities are, so that they don’t necessarily contribute to our
understanding of causes. I will assume that the world is near-enough deterministic
on the macroscopic scale, and that probabilities belong to general causation and
to statistical methods for finding causes. If smoking causes cancer, then on some
particular occasion it either was a necessary condition for that cancer, or it wasn’t
a cause of it. The probabilities enter because we don’t know what other condi-
tions are necessary in general together with smoking for cancer to occur, or exactly
when these conditions obtain. There are likely also truly stochastic facts, such as
the precise time of some quantum event. This kind of indeterminism can certainly
propagate to the macroscopic world, for example if we were to use a true random
number generator to control some process. However, since we can distinguish
facts finely—as in making a distinction between the electron emitting a photon and
SPECIFICITY AND REDUNDANT CAUSATION 15
it emitting a photon at t—we can allow for that these facts are not caused at all
(since they are not even determined by natural law). Thus, causes are generally
necessary for their effects on the occasion. What seems to have most effectively
convinced people otherwise is examples of apparently redundant causation, and we
turn to those now.
5.2. Symmetric overdetermination and event fragility. For some perfectly pos-
sible causal scenarios, it seems to many that there is nothing that both is of a kind
such that it could be a cause and is necessary for the effect under the circumstances.
Rather, several cause-like factors are each sufficient for the effect on that occasion.
There are several distinct kinds of causal redundancy in the literature, mainly the
cases of preemption and of symmetrical overdetermination. My treatment is simi-
lar for both. I will start with Lewis’s characterization of what has come to be called
symmetrical overdetermination. (I think it is Lewis’s term originally, although he
calls it “redundancy” in this passage.)
Suppose we have two events c1 and c2, and another event e distinct
from both of them; and in actuality all three occur; and if either
one of c1 and c2 had occurred without the other, then also e would
have occurred; but if neither c1 nor c2 had occurred, then e would
not have occurred. Then I shall say that c1 and c2 are redundant
causes of e. (Lewis 1987, p. 31.)
In this passage, Lewis describes what could be understood as a disjunctive cause
of e. It is the disjunction of the events c1 and c2. Such disjunctions have appeared
before, and after, in the philosophical literature on causation. In (Mackie 1965, p.
26), J. L. Mackie says about a possible case of the same general form, “In such
cases, the requirements of my analysis [. . .] are not met: each proposed cause is
redundant and not even necessary post factum, though the disjunction of them is
necessary post factum and non-redundant.” Both Mackie and Lewis take the causal
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relata to be events, and they both reject the disjunction as being the cause in these
examples. And both appeal to similar explanations for why these cases fail in their
theories without making the theories inadequate: on such occasions when both c1
and c2 actually happened and each was sufficient for e, our everyday judgment as to
what was the cause would be unclear (Mackie 1965, p. 26, and Lewis 1987, p. 31).
The theory is adequate, on this particular point, in virtue of following everyday
intuitions.
Lewis furthermore observes that whether there is a case of redundancy in any
realistic example of this kind depends on how finely we individuate the events in
question, in the possibility space. That is, how different can the same event be
as it occurs in a different possible world? Let’s take a killing as an example. (It
is a tradition.) We want to say that A’s shooting B was the cause of B’s death.
Lewis remarks that just because B would have died at some point anyway, so A’s
shooting B was not necessary for B ’s eventual death, that doesn’t make this a case
of redundant causation. It’s only a case of redundancy if some other event that
actually occurred was sufficient for bringing about the same death as the one that
happened. Similarly, if A andC both shot B simultaneously, it is still only a case of
redundant causation if the death that occurs when both A and C fire is the same as
the one that occurs when only A fires, and also the same as the one that occurs when
only B fires. In the first example, when only A fires, it is clearly unreasonable to
take B’s eventual death, that would undoubtedly have happened if A had not shot B,
but possible many years later, as the same death as the one caused by A’s shooting.
But in the last example it may seem unreasonable to say that the deaths occurring
when both A and B fire, when only A fires, and when only B fires, are distinct
events. How fragile or robust we take the events involved in the causation to be
makes all the difference.
Lewis elaborates further on the problem of taking events to be very fragile:
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[S]uppose there was a gentle soldier on the firing squad, and he did
not shoot. If the minute difference made by eight bullets instead
of seven is enough to make a different event, then so is the minute
difference made by eight instead of nine. So if the victim’s death
is so very fragile that it would not have occurred without your act,
equally it is so fragile that it would not have occurred without the
gentle soldier’s omission. If by reason of fragility the death de-
pends causally on your act, then equally it depends causally on the
omission. So the gentle soldier caused the death by not shooting,
quite as much as you caused it by shooting! (Lewis 1987, p. 35.)
The general idea is that if we make the event in a case of apparent redundant cau-
sation so fragile that we can distinguish a uniquely sufficient cause, then it also
becomes dependent on things we intuitively would never call causes of that event.
But, to complicate things further (this complication is mine and not Lewis’s), we
can supposedly refer to the same death by the term “the eight-bullet death” (since
it was in fact an eight-bullet death). If the rules for executions state that every ex-
ecution should be an at-least nine-bullet death, then our gentle soldier might be in
some trouble by having caused the rules to be violated. It’s the same event, with
supposedly the same causes, so why is this causal claim suddenly more reason-
able? Perhaps we adjust the modal fragility of events from one claim to another,
based on context and pragmatic concerns? Lewis suggests that something like a
“double standard” is involved in such cases as when we on the one hand want to
reject the gentle soldier’s not shooting as a cause of the death of the prisoner, and
on the other hand accept his not shooting as a cause of the eight-bullet death of
the prisoner. If we think that an event cannot both have an event as its cause and
not have that event as its cause, then “the death” and “the eight-bullet death” must
refer to different events. But they are certainly related, because it was that death
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that was an eight-bullet death. Lewis is not suggesting that he has a solution to this
problem.
I have emphasized two features in this discussion about symmetrically overde-
termined causation. One is the observation, made early in the literature, that in
these cases a disjunction does satisfy the necessity condition on causes—the other
is that how modally fragile we take events to be can have dramatic effects on the
intuitive truth values of causal claims involving those effects. Before I go on to
how these things connect to our understanding of causes as facts and our interpre-
tations of disjunctive sentences and degrees of specificity, I should say something
about the other major kind of causal redundancy: preemption. But even before that
I should mention that Hugh Mellor has also made the observation that disjunctions
qualify as causes in cases of redundancy, and that he, advocating facts as causes
but facts substantially different from ours, embraces them.
[I]n the circumstances S, if Don had neither fallen [C] nor been
shot [C′], his chance of dying [E] would have been zero. So be-
tween them C and C′ do provide one deterministic cause of E,
namely C∨C′: Don dies because he falls or is shot. (Mellor 1995,
p. 102.)
Mellor defends this claim but does not provide an intuitive understanding of the
cause in question. I don’t know how sympathetic he would be to the proposal I
make in this text.
5.3. Preemption, early and late. Imagine a case such as the one outlined by
Lewis in the first quote above, but in which c2 does not in fact happen, and where
c2 would have happened if c1 had not. That is, c1 is a preventer of c2, and both
c1 and c2 are individually sufficient for the effect e on the occasion. An old ex-
ample case is from Michael Scriven, retold by Mackie (Mackie 1965, p. 25): a
man suffers a heart attack at t1, which causes him to die at t3, although, had he
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not had the heart attack, he would have had a stroke at t2, again killing him at t3.
There is broad agreement that in a case such as this, common intuitions strongly
suggest that it is c1 that is the cause. After all, c2 didn’t even happen. “It is clear
what answer we want—the preempting cause is a cause, the preempted alternative
is not—and any analysis that does not yield that answer is in bad trouble” (Lewis
1987, p. 36). Nevertheless, given the logic of the situation as we have described it,
had c1 not happened, it would not have prevented c2 from happening, and c2 would
have caused e, so c1is not necessary for e in the circumstances. If causes are neces-
sary on the occasion, c1 cannot be the cause of e. “It is easy for me to say why the
preempted alternative is not a cause: the effect does not depend on it. My problem
is to say why the preempting cause is a cause, when the effect does not depend on it
either” (ibid). Hence, the problem is logically analogous to the symmetrical case.
They differ in our intuitions, and in how they have been dealt with in theories of
causation. Several attempts to resolve this situation, in particular Lewis’s, hinges
on that there is a series of causal dependencies (perhaps called a process or causal
chain) all the way from c1 to e but not from c2 to e. That there is no such causal
chain from c2 when c2 doesn’t happen is obvious. But it’s not obvious, at least
to me, that there is always an intermediate causal link between any cause and its
effect. If the assumption is that there is one just when we need it—that is to say, in
cases of preemption—then this appears severely ad hoc.
Either way, cases of so-called late preemption introduce new difficulties. An
often used example has two persons, say Kim and Jim, each throwing a rock at the
same window, but Kim throwing ever so slightly before Jim. Kim’s rock breaks
the window, and Jim’s passes through the resulting hole. Had Kim not thrown
her rock, Jim’s rock would have broken the window. Both throws happened, and
Kim’s throw is not necessary for the breaking of the windows in these circum-
stances. Here there is no intermediate event in a causal chains from Kim’s throw
to the breaking of the window, that happens at a time when the causal chain from
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Jim’s throw has already been preempted, but before the effect takes place. Noth-
ing interrupts the causal chain from Jim’s throw, only the actual breaking of the
window, the effect itself, prevents Jim’s rock from breaking it. Lewis considers an
appeal to fragility for these cases (Lewis 1987, p. 40). The window breaks ever so
slightly later than it would have, had Kim not thrown her rock. But he ultimately
rejects this solution, since he can imagine situations where we must make the effect
so fragile that we include some subtle feature of it that depends on the preempted
cause, and redundancy is not escaped after all. It is beyond the scope of this text
to recount the many important proposed solutions to late preemption, or even just
Lewis’s solution (but see Paul 2003 for a good summary). Since the approach to
cases of apparent redundancy presented here does not distinguish substantially in
its treatment of early and late preemption, nor between other types of redundancy,
such as preempted prevention and trumping, we should get to it now.
6. TWO STRATEGIES FOR REDUNDANT CAUSATION
6.1. Fact causes: a recap. To recapitulate: I have argued that facts are plausible
causal relata, based on that there is no consistency in what kind of things we in
ordinary causal talk designate as the cause on some occasion, that facts can stand
in the right nomic and logical relations to be causes and effects, and deal with
absence causes better than events do. I have also suggested that they are metaphys-
ically plausible when viewed as properties of worlds. (This is without question the
most contentious part of my proposal.) These can in turn be modeled as sets of
worlds, which leads to a picture of facts, whether presence- or absence-, as mul-
tiply realizable. We saw that writers on mental causation have both recognized
the role of multiply realizable causes, and generalized these beyond the domain of
mental causation. I’ve tried to introduce a further generalization, to multiply real-
izable facts, of which mental facts would be a special case, and connected these to
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a predictable notion of relative specificity between sentences expressing facts, that
follows logical strength and entailment.
Another thing these facts can do that events cannot is allow for disjunctive
causes (and effects). We have already seen what appears to be an uncontrover-
sial example. Some causes are multiply realizable. Correspondingly, some facts
are naturally partitioned such that each part is a distinct way for the fact to be re-
alized (such as a distinct time interval). For every partition, some part contains the
actual world—that is, some part is the actual realizer of the fact in question. We
then suggested that when both cause and effect are multiply realizable, the realizer
of the cause, however chosen, will cause a realizer of the effect, of corresponding
specificity. But not just corresponding in specificity—also in the aspect of real-
ization on which the partition was made. The second-precision timed realizer of
the stone throw causes the second-precision timed realizer of the window break-
age. More intelligible: “the window broke because a stone was thrown at it,” but
“the window broke at t because a stone was thrown at it at t − ε” (for t of some
precision).
That is to say, the question of more or less specific realizers of a fact is not like
more or less modally fragile events. In expressing facts we have at our disposal the
full resources of the language.
6.2. Preemption and finding the right effect. Kim throws her rock at the win-
dow. Jim doesn’t bother to throw his rock, but would have thrown it at the window
if Kim hadn’t thrown hers. It seems as though Kim’s throw isn’t necessary under
the circumstances for the breaking of the window—nevertheless, I wholeheartedly
agree with the intuition that Kim’s rock caused the window to break. Why? I think
it is because Kim’s throw caused the realizer of the window’s breaking, and Jim’s
throw, since it didn’t even happen, didn’t. This is a matter of recognizing that the
real effect of Kim’s throw was something more specific than the window breaking
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in general, but this intuition is already evident in past attempts to take the effect
of the intuitive cause to be an event more fragile than first supposed. It seems as
though that strategy works for us—and does so partly because facts, as opposed to
events, are not indiscriminately more or less specific.
What if Jim had thrown his rock, just a little later than Kim threw hers, as in the
case of late preemption? Then both rock throws happen, but still only one of them
caused a realizer of the breaking of the window, and that was Kim’s. That is, Kim’s
throw, and not Jim’s, was necessary and sufficient for a realizer of the breaking of
the window. Take the realizer in question (there will be many candidates) of “the
window broke” to be “the window broke at t,” with the precision of t sufficiently
high. If Jim’s rock throw had broken the window after t, then it was not sufficient
for that realizer.
The general strategy for cases of preemption is then to find the fact that the
intuitive causal fact alone was sufficient and necessary for, and that is a realizer of
the supposed effect. If we are successful, we can take that to validate our causal
intuitions for that example.
6.3. Symmetric overdetermination and interpreting disjunctive causes. What
if there is no such realizer of the effect, that one of the redundant alternatives is
uniquely sufficient and necessary for? These would be strictly symmetrical cases
of overdetermination. Lewis suggests that it is very unlikely that there are such in
the actual world, and I think so too. In the case of the firing squad, the actual death
from nine bullets (given that all the soldiers fired) constitutes a different fact from
the merely possible eight-bullet death. The nine-bullet death is then caused by the
conjunction of the actual firings of each soldier, and there is no redundancy. But
if the causal concept makes sense also in fictional worlds, it may be enough that
there is such a world, perhaps one where magic works, in which we can intelligibly
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talk of causes, and where there are such genuinely and strictly symmetric causa-
tions. (They may then also contain cases where there are no intermediate links in
a causal chain from cause to effect.) In such situations we cannot regiment our
effect sentence to find the uniquely sufficient cause, but must instead try to under-
stand the disjunctive cause sentence directly. Firstly, we saw in our definitions of
facts and specificity that disjunctive facts are not special. Almost every sentence is
equivalent to a disjunction of more specific sentences. So we might just take the
disjunction as expressing the cause fact, see this as a result, and leave it at that.
But this is not completely satisfying—surely there is some way of making sense
of at least some of these disjunctions? There is, in many cases, if not all. We
said that a disjunction can be taken to express a less specific fact than its disjuncts,
under certain conditions. Sometimes there is also a non-disjunctive sentence that
is equivalent to the disjunction in question, and intuitively less specific than the
disjuncts. This was straightforwardly true when adjusting specificity was a matter
of adding or removing predicates, adverbs, and adverbial phrases, but it is also true
when we are dealing with disjunctions. If two magicians R and S both cast a spell
that will turn the prince into a frog at midnight (this example is a simplification of
one by Jonathan Schaffer, where he uses it for other things), then we can stipulate
that there is no difference at all in the effect as it would happen if only one, or
only the other, or both of the magicians cast the spell. This is a situation where we
would have to accept that the disjunction, “R cast the spell or S cast the spell” is the
cause. But this disjunction is equivalent to an existential generalization, restricted
by context: “Some magician [of R and S] cast the spell,” that we may well find in-
tuitively more acceptable than the disjunctive form. There is such a cause also for
the breaking of the window and the execution of the prisoner, when these effects
are taken sufficiently generally. The fact that some person [of Kim and Jim] threw
a stone caused the window to break. And in the early preemption example, Kim’s
throw was the realizer of that more general cause.
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Generally, then, if none of the redundant alternatives is such that it uniquely was
sufficient for a realizer of the effect, we must say that the cause was the disjunction
of the redundant alternatives that obtained on the occasion, and try to achieve some
intuitive understanding of this disjunction as a cause—but we are equipped to do
so in many cases.
6.4. Multiple realizability again. I’ll give one more example of the strategy of
taking a disjunction of alternatives as the cause of some effect. The issue for Yablo
in the quoted passages above was a competition in causal relevance between a
multiply realizable event and its realizer. Consider again Sophie, pecking, as she
was taught, at a red triangle that happens to be scarlet. By the exclusion principle,
we might say that the causal sufficiency of the realizer, the fact that the triangle
is scarlet, excludes that the redness was the cause of Sophie’s pecking, contrary
to how the story of her training was told to us. Another alternative was to invite
causal redundancy. It’s hard to believe, perhaps, that there would be a change in
the specifics of Sophie’s pecking act depending on what shade of red the triangle
is, so let’s assume that regimenting the effect is not an option. What remains is to
treat the disjunction “The triangle is red or the triangle is scarlet” as the cause of
Sophie’s pecking at the triangle. But in this case, the disjuncts are not independent.
In fact, the latter entails the former, even if not logically then just in virtue of
that the fact expressed by the latter sentence is a realizer of the fact expressed
by the former. (The worlds in which the triangle is scarlet constitute a subset of
the worlds in which it is red.) This means that the disjunction is of the general
form φ ∨ (φ ∧ψ)—where φ corresponds to the less specific sentence “the triangle
is red”—which is equivalent to φ . Generally, any disjunction is equivalent to its
logically weakest, that is to say least specific, disjunct—which may be one or more
disjuncts—so the strategy of taking the redundant alternatives will give us the least
specific sufficient alternative as the cause.
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7. ISSUES: STRICTURE, METAPHYSICS, AND LOGICALLY EQUIVALENT
SENTENCES
This theory demands a lot of our causal claims. In fact, if our everyday causal
statements are taken literally, it is unlikely that we ever make any true causal
claims. This could certainly be seen as a problem. The theory (as far as it goes)
does not validate everyday causal talk, when that is taken verbatim. On the other
hand, we know that what we say in everyday contexts is imprecise and rarely ex-
actly true. (But not all false claims are equal.) We know this, because we recognize
contexts in which we must better ourselves, such as when giving a properly scien-
tific explanation. Moreover, with sufficient theoretical demands on stricture, we
may detect patterns in how we talk loosely about causes, that could be explained.
It seems to me, for example, that we have a tendency to tolerate in particular un-
derspecified effects and overspecified causes. This might be interesting.
As I have already suggested, the metaphysics of the causal relata presented here
is, to say the least, contrary to current mainstream views. The demand that causes
“exist in the world” may or may not be seen to be met on this account. However,
the history of science and of our theoretical pursuits in general seem to show that
the intuitiveness of concepts employed weigh lightly compared to the expressive
power and pragmatic worth of theories. (Consider cases of space, time, and action-
at-a-distance. Perhaps also calculus.) Partly for this reason, and partly because I
have no better suggestion for understanding causes while achieving the theoreti-
cal power that appears to me required to reason fruitfully about causes, I tend to
focus on whether the theory gets truth values of causal claims right rather than on
metaphysical intuitiveness (without completely ignoring the latter—we continue to
have beliefs about space, time, and action-at-a-distance even if they are revised). I
expect significant resistance on this front, and look forward to criticisms and sug-
gestions.
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On a related note, in Laurie Paul’s (Paul 2004), in which she presents a theory
of aspect causation which appears to me a significant improvement compared to
the most influential event-relational views, the tension in fine-grained event theo-
ries (Kim’s and Lewis’s) between on the one hand the need for enough theoretical
power to be able to access what is causally relevant in a singular causation, and
on the other hand the need to live up to metaphysical intuitions about causal re-
lata, becomes exceptionally clear. This is largely because Paul puts pressure on
the parts of these theories where they have problems delivering, and hers can. In
taking aspects of events to be causal relata, instead of including event properties
in the theory but nevertheless take causation to relate events as a whole, she con-
tinues, in my mind, an approach toward a fact-relational view begun by Kim and
Lewis. (No doubt they would disagree.) I take the final step—making causal relata
a full Boolean algebra mirroring the entailment relation between sentences—at the
expense of some metaphysical intuitiveness. (This makes it different to Mellor’s
theory, which does not view causation as a relation at all.) Having this structure
also makes possible a uniform treatment of absence and disjunctive causes.
A final concern. If what matters to the truth of a causal claim is that the an-
tecedent sentence expresses the right fact, then we cannot distinguish between log-
ically equivalent sentences. This means that we have no condition for excluding
causally irrelevant things from being mentioned in the antecedent. For, if φ ex-
presses the cause, then so, as we have already observed, does φ ∨ (φ ∧ψ), and ψ
can be anything—for example the conjunction of every sentence in the Bible. This
is because we do not want to try to introduce syntactic conditions—that tends to
not end well (see Kim’s criticism of Mackie, in (Kim 1971)). What we can do is
easily imagine that such conditions are introduced on the pragmatic level—that of
logically equal statements, a more efficient one will be preferred when possible.
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